T he greatest inequity in the American health care system exists not between the nonpoor and the poor, but between the insured poor and the uninsured poor. Contrary to popular belief, the federal-state Medicaid program does not provide health care coverage for "the poor." Instead, Medicaid protects only selected groups of lowincome individuals and families who happen to meet its arbitrary and confusing eligibility standards. In 1982, in any given month, 49.3 percent of those with incomes below the federal poverty standard had no public or private health insurance, 37.5 percent were covered by Medicaid, and 13.2 percent by employer-provided health insurance. 1 Wide and growing gaps in Medicaid coverage have fueled escalating amounts of "uncompensated care"-charity care and bad-debt care. Public hospitals now bear the major financial burden for the health care of a substantial number of persons who have inadequate income, no private health insurance, and yet are ineligible for Medicaid.
The gap between the uninsured and the insured persists and may, in fact, be growing mainly because of the quirky requirements of Medicaid eligibility. While Medicaid and Medicare have vastly improved access to health care for some low-income persons, Medicaid eligibility allows only certain groups of the poor to benefit from this improved access. 2 The reason for this is that eligibility for Medicaid is linked to eligibility for "welfare" cash assistance. 3 Medicaid today echoes and amplifies the severe inequities-both intrastate and interstate-of our welfare system. The result is arbitrary distinctions in access to health care and, ultimately, inefficient health care practices. Moreover, the tie between Medicaid and cash assistance seriously hinders the development of rational policy in both health care and income support.
Consider the case of a young Oklahoma man with hemophilia. Since birth, he has required blood clotting factor at an annual cost of $6,000 to $8,000 and frequent hospitalization. His health care costs were covered by Medicaid until the age of twenty-one because his family's income and assets made him eligible as a "medically needy" child. Once he turned twenty-one, because of the linkage to welfare eligibility, he was no longer eligible for Medicaid coverage, regardless of his health care costs. None of his financial or medical circumstances had changed-only his age. He was advised by a caseworker that his only hope of continued medical assistance was to quit his part-time job and schooling and establish himself as permanently and totally disabled. He would then be eligible for SSI disability support and, as a result, eligible for Medicaid. In other words, the only way for him to receive life-supporting medical care was to give up all attempts at productivity and independence, become "disabled," and receive public income support as well. This is but one small example of the perversities of the current eligibility system. Surely there is something wrong with an eligibility system which produces this result. Equity and other policy considerations suggest that eligibility for medical assistance should no longer be dependent on eligibility for income assistance. Eligibility for Medicaid is now so complex that few people understand its effects and even those close to the program sometimes fail to comprehend its intricacies. 4 The complexity has ramifications throughout the system: program administrators, caseworkers, and clients have little understanding of the eligibility parameters and who is actually eligible for assistance.
Understanding the details of the categorical linkage between Medicaid and cash assistance eligibility is a laborious but essential task for those concerned with health policy. Along with that knowledge comes a critical appreciation of the structural problems that stem from tying access to medical care to cash welfare programs. What follow are not isolated examples but systemic problems effecting large numbers of poor families and individuals. One purpose of this paper is to provide an impetus for reform by dramatizing the results of the eligibility linkage. We begin by outlining the current system of eligibility in some detail and then assessing the shortcomings of that system. The paper concludes with a recommendation for change.
Medicaid Eligibility: A Complex Reflection Of Welfare Categories
The Medicaid program does not have its own eligibility criteria but incorporates eligibility standards from two public cash assistance programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Th is seemingly simple linkage has two important implications which will appear again and again in our examples of interstate and intrastate inequities. First, to be eligible for Medicaid, individuals must not only lack income and assets but they must maintain a "categorical relationship" to welfare; that is, they must also meet the nonincome welfare requirements concerning family structure, age, disability, and labor force attachment. Second, Medicaid (like AFDC and SSI) is not a uniform federal program but rather fifty different state programs. This is especially apparent when looking at eligibility; there are so many different state options that access to Medicaid for subsets of the poor population differs dramatically from state to state. Generally speaking, there are three categories of people potentially eligible under federal guidelines for Medicaid: current AFDC recipients and optionally covered AFDC groups; current SSI recipients and optionally covered SSI groups; and the medically needy. However, specific eligibility standards within each of these groups and coverage of the optional groups rest with individual state decisions. Thus these classifications only begin to define the parameters within which state-to-state variation occurs.
Families with children. All states have Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs which provide cash assistance to singleparent families. About half the states have AFDC-Unemployed Parent programs which provide assistance to married-couple families in which the principal earner is unemployed. However, these "AFDC-UP" programs are quite small, accounting for only about 10 percent of all AFDC recipients.
Federal law requires that states provide Medicaid coverage to all current AFDC recipients. States must also provide temporary coverage for families terminated from AFDC because of increased earnings or hours of employment; this coverage must last as least four months. In addition to this mandatory coverage, states have the option of extending assistance to any of the following groups (parenthetical number notes the number of states choosing each option): those eligible for, but not receiving, AFDC (twenty-five states); those eligible for assistance, but institutionalized (forty states); those who would be eligible if child care costs were paid from earnings rather than through social service plans (fifteen states); those under age twenty-one who would be eligible for AFDC but do not qualify as dependent children (twenty-nine states); and those who would be eligible if the state's AFDC plan were as broad as allowed by federal law (eleven states). Thus, depending on the number of options chosen, state Medicaid coverage for families with children can be relatively broad or fairly restrictive. In 1982, of the 20.15 million Medicaid recipients, 12.4 million lived in families receiving AFDC and .7 million lived in families eligible under optional state programs related to AFDC. Combined, they account for less than 25 percent of Medicaid expenditures.
The elderly and disabled. Low-income elderly persons and severely disabled persons of any age may qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The linkage between Medicaid eligibility and SSI eligibility is somewhat more complex than that between Medicaid and AFDC. First, states have the option of imposing stricter eligibility standards for Medicaid than for SSI. 5 Fourteen states use such restricted standards. However, states are also required to cover certain "grandfather clause" groups.
"Eligibility for Medicaid is now so complex that few people understand its effects and even those close to the program sometimes fail to comprehend its intricacies."
(thirty-two states). 7 In 1982, 4.1 million SSI recipients and an additional .9 million elderly or disabled persons received Medicaid benefits. They account for more than 50 percent of Medicaid expenditures.
The medically needy. Twenty-nine states have opted to provide coverage for the medically needy. This coverage is limited to those who would be eligible for cash assistance except that their income is above the cash eligibility threshold. 8 To qualify as medically needy, a family must incur medical expenses large enough to reduce their income to a specified level. Under federal law, that "spend-down" level cannot exceed 133 percent of the maximum AFDC payment in that state. For example, in Maryland, where the maximum AFDC payment for a family of four is $3,912 per year, the spend-down level-the level to which a family must reduce their income to qualify for medically needy coverage-could not exceed $5,215 (133 percent of $3,912). The actual level established by Maryland is well below that at $4,404. Thus, a mother with three children and who earns $4,800 must spend $396 for medical care in order to qualify for medically needy coverage. In 1982, 2.7 million people received Medicaid services under medically needy plans.
As the labyrinth of eligibility suggests, Medicaid by no means provides health care coverage for all of the poor. Exhibit 1 depicts the health insurance coverage of persons in poor families. As can be seen, Medicaid provides very patchy coverage for poor families and individuals. It is most adequate for children in poor families headed by single women, 91 percent of these children have some sort of health insurance. On the other hand, only 31 percent of the children in poor married-couple families have either public or private health insurance. Among adults, 72 percent of the adults in poor female-headed families have insurance, compared to only 26 percent of the adults in poor married-couple families.
Being Poor Is Not Enough: Understanding Medicaid's Inequities
The linkage of Medicaid to welfare creates many inequities including those which result from: different eligibility standards for AFDC and SSI; eligibility based on family structure; eligibility ceilings on AFDC and SSI; the treatment of welfare recipients and nonrecipients; varying state AFDC and SSI eligibility levels; and state decisions on medically needy programs.
AFDC and SSI have different eligibility requirements. Horizontal inequities-differences in the treatment of persons in similar circumstancesthat exist in welfare programs have been transferred to Medicaid. One problem arises from the fact that income eligibility limits for AFDC are significantly lower than those for SSI. Thus, while two applicants may have comparable incomes, one may be eligible for Medicaid while the other is not. An elderly or disabled applicant may qualify for SSI while another applicant with the same income does not qualify for AFDC. Couples with income less than $492 a month can qualify for SSI; but in most states a family of two with that income will not qualify for AFDC. AFDC eligibility is often based on family type. A second inequity arises from the nature of the AFDC program itself. Generally, AFDC is an assistance program for single-parent families (predominantly families headed by single women). About half the states maintain an optional AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program which provides benefits to married-couple families in which the principal earner is unemployed.
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In those states without an AFDC-UP program, an inequity exists in the treatment of single-parent and two-parent families. Two families-one headed by a single parent, the other by a married couple-may have the same needs, but only the first family will be eligible for health care coverage under Medicaid. This inequity may serve as an incentive for family break-up.
Frank Eligibility ceilings create substantial inequities. Linkage of welfare and Medicaid eligibility poses two further problems. In the twenty states without a medically needy program, the eligibility ceiling for welfare is also the eligibility ceiling for Medicaid. This means that if a family passes one dollar over the ceiling, it loses its welfare benefits and, more importantly, its Medicaid coverage. This creates a significant notch between those families just above and just below the ceiling. This serves as a powerful work disincentive for many families hoping to work their way off welfare.
Betty 17 Julie must buy expensive health insurance for her family.
State eligibility ceilings vary greatly. The amount of money a family can earn and still qualify for welfare varies greatly from state to state. In fact, these interstate variations provide the most glaring evidence of the program's failure to protect the poor. Currently, maximum AFDC benefits for a family of four range from $1.20 in Mississippi to $625 in California and $676 in New York. These maximum payments reflect the income ceiling for welfare in each state. 18 Exhibit 2 depicts the distribution of maximum AFDC payments for a family of four.
Mrs The effect of this interstate inequity can be seen in Exhibit 3 which shows the proportion of children in poverty covered by Medicaid in each state.
Only half the states provide AFDC to two-parent families. The linkage of Medicaid to welfare brings another inequity to Medicaid because of the state-optional AFDC-UP program. Since only half the states maintain such programs, medical assistance to low-income families sometimes seems more a function of geography than need. A two-parent family with an unemployed father in Washington, D.C. might qualify for AFDC (and, consequently, Medicaid) while a similarly situated family a few miles away in Virginia would not qualify since Virginia does not have an AFDC-UP program. The same holds true for a family in Illinois (which has a UP program) and Indiana (which does not), Washington (UP) and Idaho (non-UP), and so on.
Medicaid coverage for the medically needy is optional. The medically needy component of Medicaid does alleviate some problems by extending coverage to categorically eligible individuals with significant health care costs. 20 The intent of the medically needy option is to assist individuals who meet all criteria for cash assistance with the exception of income, and who have incurred relatively large medical bills.
The medically needy component does, however, lead to several more inequities. First, twenty states do not have medically needy programs. Thus, two families, each categorically eligible but above the income eligibility ceiling, each with a child incurring substantial medical bills, will find themselves with or without Medicaid, solely on the basis of geography. Second, since medically needy coverage is available only to the categorically eligible, many individuals and two-parent families with large medical expenses cannot qualify for coverage, irrespective of their income and medical expenses. For example, even in a state with a medically needy option and an AFDC-unemployed parent program, a large number of poor families would be ineligible because of requirements for a recent "attachment to the labor force." This means that a young family in which neither parent had a job would not be able to get Medicaid coverage for themselves or their children.
Third, states that offer the medically needy program set their own spenddown levels, that is, income levels to which the family must spend down in order to qualify for medical assistance. These spend-down thresholds are greater than the state's AFDC maximum payment but not more than 133 percent of that level. Exhibit 4 depicts the differing state spenddown levels and shows again how the Medicaid program (in this case, the medically needy component) mirrors the severe inequities of state AFDC programs. 
Policy Considerations: A Two-Edged Failure
Impeding the positive development of health care policy. Medicaid eligibility standards have assumed not only the inequities of welfare programs, but also their incentives and disincentives. Basing eligibility for medical assistance on marital status serves as an incentive for family break-up; basing eligibility for medical assistance on earnings serves as a disincentive for work; basing eligibility for medical assistance on permanent disability promotes dependence. Rational development of health care policy would eliminate these disincentives and move toward broader eligibility based on an individual's financial and health needs.
Moreover, the current eligibility system fosters inefficient and undesirable health care practices. Many low-income, uninsured persons neglect inexpensive regular and preventive health care and instead rely on expensive and intensive care in emergency rooms and public hospitals. Thus, a condition which might have been remedied through routine care requires more substantial care, such as hospitalization. Unmet health care needs do not simply disappear. Health care costs for the non-Medicaid indigent are absorbed by both public and private hospitals. In 1982, state and local governments spent $9.4 billion for nonMedicaid hospital care and private hospitals provided charity and baddebt care totalling $3.2 billion. Thus, uncompensated care in 1982 totalled more than $12 billion.
The current Medicaid system also contains an incentive for institutionalization. Disabled individuals with family income above SSI eligibility limits but income insufficient to meet health care costs are forced into institutions in order to qualify for SSI and Medicaid. Health care policymakers have long recognized the high cost (both fiscal and human) of institutionalization, but are unable to remove these incentives because of the linkage between Medicaid and welfare. Again, that linkage forestalls a positive development of health care policy.
Impeding the positive development of income support policy. The deleterious effects of the linkage are, of course, two-edged. Medicaid costs have far outgrown welfare program costs: in 1983 Medicaid expenditures totaled $32.4 billion, more than AFDC and SSI combined. Thus, while Medicaid is technically a stepchild of welfare, it holds great sway over the development of income support programs, particularly over decisions made at the state level.
SSI eligibility levels are federally indexed to the cost-of-living; thus, the states have little control over SSI eligibility. In terms of SSI itself, this poses little problem since most benefits are federally funded. However, the cost of the automatic Medicaid coverage conferred by SSI must be borne in part by the states, leaving the states very little control over the SSI portion of Medicaid.
Thus, as state legislatures search for ways to reduce burgeoning Medicaid expenditures, one of the few areas to which they can turn is the AFDC component of Medicaid. It is very likely that legislatures have foregone broadening AFDC eligibility or increasing AFDC benefits in order to keep some control on Medicaid costs. As noted above, Medicaid costs for AFDC recipients are relatively low, but AFDC eligibility is one of the only parts of Medicaid costs that state legislatures can control.
This helps to explain why, in constant dollars, AFDC benefits have declined by 33 percent since 1970. It also explains why, between 1972 and 1983, the number of Medicaid-SSI recipients grew at twice the rate of Medicaid-AFDC recipients. This occurred despite the fact that, in this same period, the number of poor persons in female-headed families increased by 48 percent while the number of poor elderly persons remained constant. 
Conclusion
During the recent recession, the holes in the Medicaid system became so painfully apparent that Congress came close to passing a health insurance program for the unemployed. When unemployment receded, the urgency for that particular reform dissipated.
More recently, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 addressed some of the Medicaid's eligibility gaps. Included in the act was the Child Health Assurance Program (CHAP), which extends coverage to many low-income pregnant women not covered by Medicaid and phases in coverage for children born in poor families.
The passage of CHAP reflects Congress' awareness that the twentyyear-old linkage between Medicaid and welfare programs has outlived its usefulness. While CHAP is a step in the right direction, it is clearly not enough. The urgent plight of public hospitals is further evidence of the need for a more thorough reform of the Medicaid program to provide health care protection for the uninsured poor.
One such reform was proposed by the National Study Group on State Medicaid Strategies. 22 As part of a fundamental restructuring of Medicaid, the group called for the creation of a National Primary Care Plan. 23 Under this plan, eligibility for health care would no longer be tied to welfare status, but would be based on individual and family income. The program would establish a national eligibility standard based on a percentage of the federal poverty level.
Preliminary cost estimates for the plan (which also includes a series of service-delivery reforms to improve efficiency) indicate that the eligibility level could be set fairly close to the poverty standard without incurring new public costs. The plan would cover many of the currently uninsured, significantly reducing the amount of uncompensated care and relieving the unfair burden now placed on public hospitals and other providers of last resort. Expanding health coverage for the poor reflects the view that the uncompensated care issue should not be treated simply as a fiscal matter but as a symptom of gaps in public and private health insurance. Subsidies to faltering public hospitals are at best a stop-gap method which neglects the root of the uncompensated care problem.
In sum, the establishment of a uniform national eligibility standard would facilitate the positive development of both health care and income support policies. Such a reform would reduce the work and family disincentives that exist in the current system. Moreover, it would encourage the provision of health care in less costly and more appropriate settings, thus fostering positive health practices. Finally, reforming Medicaid eligibility would fulfill an unfulfilled national commitment to provide health protection for all of the nation's poor. 
